It’s time to unite against polarization

Answering these questions requires a closer look at the concept of polarization. Political scientists distinguish between different types of polarization, with ideological polarization being the most well-known. When two political groups increasingly diverge in their views, this is referred to as ideological polarization. However, such ideological differences alone are not inherently problematic - a democracy thrives on a diversity of opinions. Ideological polarization becomes concerning when the political groups separate themselves from one another across a range of topics.

In Germany, studies on ideological polarization present a nuanced picture: Between 1980 and 2010, political camps grew less distinct. On key issues like migration, LGBTQ+ rights, or economic inequality, the center of German society remains largely united – despite the presence of radical fringe groups. 

Are concerns about increasing political divisions in Germany overblown? A closer look at global trends suggests otherwise. Another form of polarization, affective polarization, has been rising rapidly. Unlike ideological polarization, which concerns policy positions, affective polarization reflects the extent to which people dislike or distrust those from opposing political groups.

Since the 1970s, affective polarization has nearly doubled in the U.S. and  grown significantly in European countries like France and Switzerland. Its impact is striking: studies in the U.S. reveal that political differences now weigh as heavily as educational background when choosing a romantic partner. In surveys, half of Republican voters indicate they would be unhappy if their child married a Democrat.

Germany is not immune to this trend. Although research on affective polarization in Germany is still in its infancy, studies suggest that levels of affective polarization in Germany are comparable to those in France, Austria, and the U.S. Measuring affective polarization in Germany is complicated by its evolving party landscape over the past decades. Our analysis of the monthly Politbarometer from Forschungsgruppe Wahlen reveals that as Germany’s political landscape has shifted, affective polarization has steadily increased.

For decades, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen has monitored how German voters perceive their own and opposing parties. Over time, a stark pattern has emerged: while voters’ positive ratings of their preferred party have stabilized at high levels, ratings for the most ideologically distant party in the Bundestag have declined sharply. By this measure, affective polarization has increased by more than 60% since the 1980s. However, during the same period, emotional divides between SPD and CDU/CSU voters have narrowed.

This presents a more nuanced picture when ideological and affective polarization are jointly examined. It is true: the political center in Germany has grown more united overall on key political issues. However, between the political center and the fringes, currently in particular towards the AfD, negative feelings have intensified significantly in the last decades. Here, society has indeed become more divided.

This trend is now also reflected in social relationships in Germany. In  our analysis of the “Deutschland Spricht” initiative by ZEIT-ONLINE, three out of four respondents reported that they had neither colleagues nor family members or friends who support the party they most strongly oppose. The most isolated party was the AfD.

Such segregation can sometimes result in absurd misperceptions about political opponents as data from the U.S. illustrates. A 2018 study found that Republicans overestimated the proportion of lesbian, gay, and bisexual people among Democrats by a factor of five. Both sides also perceive the other side as significantly more supportive of violence than they actually are. These distorted perceptions fuel animosity and hinder dialogue. A vicious cycle.

Affective polarization can also have consequences in the workplace. A study from Brazil found that business owners give preferential treatment to supporters of their own party in hiring, promotions, and even salary decisions. Similarly, data from a study in the U.S. suggests that Democrats and Republicans sort into jobs that align ideologically with their views and are even willing to take a pay cut to do so.

Can such a development also be expected in Germany? One argument against this is the structural difference between the German and the U.S. political system. In the U.S., the political divide between Republicans and Democrats runs right through society. In Germany, affective polarization is driven by negative feelings towards several, rather small parties. 

However, as Germany’s Volksparteien, the traditional mainstream parties, decline, the share of smaller parties that large parts of the population dislike may grow. Leading up to the Bundestag elections in February 2025, the AfD is polling at around 20 percent, ahead of the SPD. These trends underscore the need to understand the mechanisms driving affective polarization.

The causes of rising affective polarization remain widely debated. In the U.S., one key factor is the growing importance of partisan identity among voters. A party is no longer just a political home - party affiliation has become a core part of personal identity.  

A second driving force is the parties themselves. As parties adopt increasingly homogeneous positions within their ranks and create greater ideological distance from other parties, affective polarization rises. At the same time, party elites who increasingly adopt divisive rhetoric risk poisoning the political climate.

The third important factor is the media. Researchers point to the rise in partisan cable news as an important driver of political polarization in the US. The role of social media remains contested. Recent research in the U.S. suggests that algorithms and echo chambers may play a smaller role than once feared.

In the case of Germany, parties also draw support from distinct demographic groups. The Greens achieve stronger results in cities, while the AfD performs significantly better in rural areas and East Germany. Still, Germany’s electorate remains far less segregated than in the U.S.

The polarization of the media landscape in Germany has also not progressed to the same extent. As in the UK, a vast majority of Germans still regularly turn to public television stations for news. However, signs of eroding general trust in news are emerging in Germany as well. It also remains an open question how new social media platforms like TikTok will shape Germany’s and the global political landscape.

To counter political divisions in our society, policymakers can establish legal frameworks – for instance, to prevent the spread of fake news. Public funding is an important tool for strengthening access to civic education and non-partisan news. Politicians can lead by example by rejecting divisive rhetoric within their own ranks and embracing diverse political opinions within their parties.

Yet, government regulation is only one piece of the puzzle in addressing affective polarization. Civil society organizations play an equally vital role. Across Germany, the US, and beyond, non-profit organizations have emerged to foster dialogue between people with opposing political views and bridge political divides. Our analysis of the “Deutschland Spricht” initiative suggests that such conversations between political opponents can, in fact, help reduce affective polarization.

Another promising strategy is to leverage both social and traditional media to challenge stereotypes and highlight constructive political dialogue. In a competition, more than 400 scientists proposed interventions to combat affective polarization. The winning proposal: a commercial featuring a group of British people who first build a bar together and then sit down to discuss their political differences over a beer.

A critical challenge for the future remains: how to expand access to pro-democracy programs for a broader audience. This demands both long-term funding and a commitment from educational institutions and businesses to support or integrate such programs into their work. Recent studies highlight a key incentive: a thriving democracy is good for business.

Ultimately, addressing the threat of political divisions requires a response at the individual level. That means preserving personal connections despite political differences instead of tearing down bridges. German society has not yet grown so divided that the political dialogue between opposing groups necessary for a healthy democracy has broken down. And yet it would be wrong to underestimate the problem. The time to stand united against division is now.