The first Invest in Germany Summit takes place in Berlin on 19 and 20 October 2026, asking why and how Germany can attract investment. The “why”: a top-tier location that chronically underinvests, including from abroad. Germany is the world’s third largest economy (~EUR4.4trn GDP), the only G7 country with a AAA rating from all three major agencies, and the third most attractive investment destination in Europe in a 2026 EY survey. It has 1,700 hidden champions in the Mittelstand and R&D at 3.1% of GDP. Foreign companies are already here with an inward FDI stock exceeding EUR1.0tn. Yet between 2019 and 2025, total gross fixed investment in Germany fell 6.4%, while it rose 6.7% in the rest of the eurozone and 20.2% in the U.S. The gap is around EUR390bn versus Europe and up to EUR730bn versus the U.S. Foreign investors are not closing it: announced greenfield investment projects fell 10% in 2025 to 548 and are 44% below 2019, the lowest since 2009. German savers face the same problem. Households and corporations save more than they invest, and the surplus goes abroad (net foreign assets of 87% of GDP) at returns about 5pp below the U.S. and close to 3pp below other European countries since 1975, even below domestic returns. If German savers earn more at home, so can international investors.
The problem is not a lack of capital but a lack of sufficiently attractive opportunities to deploy it, for domestic and foreign investors alike. Net public investment averaged zero between 2002 and 2015. Years of underinvestment should have raised returns on new capital, but high energy and labor costs (compounded by the second-highest OECD tax wedge), bureaucracy (up to EUR146bn of lost output per year, per ifo) and skills shortages prevent it. Investors themselves point to Germany’s integration of industry, science and research, legal certainty and skilled workforce as strengths, and to energy costs as Europe’s main disadvantage as an investment location. Financing is also a weak point: corporate financing costs are higher than in France or Italy, partly due to a fragmented banking sector, and projects are often too small for institutional investors (11,000 local authorities, 800 municipal utilities).
The equation is changing: the fiscal shift kick-starts investment, and reforms and public risk-sharing open the door to private capital, German and international. The debt-brake reform lifts the deficit from 2-3% to 4-5% of GDP until 2028, funding defense and infrastructure. The “Deutschlandfonds” (EUR30bn of public guarantees and equity) aims to mobilize EUR130bn of private capital by covering risks that private investors will not take alone. Foreign capital is already responding: FDI inflows rose about 50% to EUR86bn in 2025. European sources contributed more than 80% of the total and the UK was the largest single investor at 31%. Domestic savings could add to the pool: shifting 5% of household financial assets out of deposits would mobilize ~EUR450bn, repatriating 10% of net foreign assets ~EUR400bn. The “Altersvorsorgedepot” (from 1 January 2027, ~EUR150bn over five years) and the proposed “Kapitalrente” (a public fund of ~EUR560bn by 2040) would build a domestic institutional investor base, a natural co investor for international capital. But much of the Altersvorsorgedepot may flow into global funds unless Germany becomes more attractive.
Germany’s investment gap can therefore become one of Europe’s largest investment opportunities, in four verticals: energy, digital infrastructure, transport and mobility, and defense. In energy, needs reach ~EUR1.3trn by 2045 (about 30% of 2025 GDP) for renewables, grids, storage and hydrogen. Projects are often too small for institutional investors (11,000 local authorities, 800 Stadtwerke), so the enablers are advisory support, standardized tenders and aggregation at district and county level, and low carbon FDI rose 25% across Europe in 2025. Digital infrastructure needs EUR275-500bn by 2030 (6-11% of GDP) for hardware, telecoms, software and data centers, and foreign capital is already committing, for example Google, Microsoft and Nvidia. The constraint is grid connection and permitting, not capital, so connection approvals should be prioritized. Transport and mobility has EUR166bn planned for 2025-29 (EUR107bn rail, EUR52bn federal roads, EUR8bn waterways), with PPP 2.0 as the enabler: performance linked service-level agreements and long-term offtake contracts that tie returns to predictable cash flows. Defense financing is ~EUR734bn over five years, enough to meet NATO’s 3.5% of GDP target for core defense by 2029, and defense FDI projects rose 84% across Europe in 2025, with simpler regulation and procurement as the enabler. Across all four, the common enablers are faster permitting and procurement, grid access, standardized structures and performance-based PPPs with long-term offtake contracts. Success would lift potential growth and ease pressure on the social state. Failure would leave Germany with higher debt and little improvement in long-term growth.