Côte d'Ivoire

In December 2025, Fitch Ratings upgraded Côte d'Ivoire’s long-term foreign-currency credit rating from ‘BB-’ to ‘BB’ with a stable outlook. This places Côte d'Ivoire just two notches below investment grade and makes it the second highest-rated economy in Sub-Saharan Africa, after Botswana. Public debt is projected to decrease by 2% to 55% of GDP in 2026. 

The fiscal profile remains manageable, with decreased pressure on liquidity. In December 2025, the IMF allowed an immediate disbursement of approximately USD839.7mn. This external support provides important liquidity and confidence, supporting the country’s fiscal adjustment efforts and helping to mitigate short-term vulnerabilities. Furthermore, in March 2025, Côte d’Ivoire issued a USD1.75bn Eurobond with a 11-year maturity, attracting strong investor demand and oversubscription. The country also bought back USD700mn of earlier Eurobonds to smooth future repayments, confirming its continued access to international capital markets. 

Fiscal consolidation in Côte d’Ivoire is progressing in line with the WAEMU convergence criteria, with the general government deficit expected to narrow to -3.1% of GDP during 2026 and further to -3.0% in 2027–2028. Despite this downward trend, the interest burden remains significant, with interest payments accounting for about 16% of government revenue for each year from 2026 to 2028. External buffers are also strengthening as usable foreign exchange reserves are projected to rise from USD10.9bn in 2025 to USD15.0bn by 2028, increasing the months of import cover from 3.2 to 5.0.  

Ivorian banks are exposed to non-reported Senegalese sovereign debt. Senegalese local currency bonds (valued between USD7-13bn, with fluctuating figures of between 30 to 50% of Senegalese GDP) were widely purchased by commercial banks in Cote d’Ivoire, though much of this was done on behalf of international financial institutions. As a result, they do not appear on their balance sheets. The possible reprofiling of Senegalese debt could have an impact to the WAEMU region, but Ivorian banks are generally solidly capitalized and the sector remains stable.

Near-term policy continuity is likely after Ouattara’s new term. However, he is among the oldest leaders at 83 years old. In addition, the 2025 presidential election period saw unrest: At least 11 deaths and over 1,650 arrests were reported after the Government imprisoned or banned main opposition leaders. In the mediumterm, succession planning for 2030 is the main uncertainty for policy predictability. 

Externally, spillovers from Sahel insecurity (northward trade corridors, cross-border attacks, displacement) remain the key geopolitical risk channel. Instability may arise from external sources as Côte d'Ivoire's three northern neighbors – Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea – are all ruled by military juntas with diverging success. In Mali, security threats remain from extremist groups which control vast parts of the country, resulting in large inflows of refugees to Cote d’Ivoire, while terrorist groups are also operating closer to the border. Côte d'Ivoire's most challenging relationship is with Burkina Faso, with which it shares strong commercial ties. Côte d'Ivoire serves as the gateway for Burkina Faso’s trade, and over 4mn Burkinabe live in Côte d'Ivoire. In recent months, relations have worsened, with diplomatic ties almost coming to a total halt. As a leading country in both ECOWAS and WAEMU, Côte d'Ivoire will need to intensify its diplomatic efforts to find solutions that not only address short-term issues but also ensure long-term stability for the Sahel and West Africa as a whole.