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Allianz Social Resilience Index 2025

The Middle-Resilience Trap

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Allianz Research

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Executive Summary

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- **In 2025, the Allianz Social Resilience Index (SRI) records a third consecutive – albeit modest – improvement, but underlying divergence remains pronounced.** The global average rose from 47.4 in 2024 to 47.9 (on a 0-100 scale) across 171 economies, driven by lower imported inflation pressures and greater currency stability in Emerging Asia and several advanced economies. Firmer governance was another driving force, including institutional stabilization in parts of Emerging Asia and Central Europe. At the same time, weaker social cohesion in the Middle East, Emerging Europe and high-income countries continued to weigh on social resilience. Northern European economies lead the ranking, with Finland (1st, 84.3), Denmark (2nd, 83.8), and Iceland (3rd, 81.4) at the top of our index. Germany (8th, 78.5), France (13th, 74.7), and the UK (18th, 72.9) remain strong, while Italy (28th, 66.8) and the US (32nd, 65.3) ranked lower but stayed in the top third. China (59th, 52.5), India (81st, 46.8), Mexico (105th, 41.3), and Brazil (112th, 40.0) ranked significantly lower, with conflict-affected states like Lebanon (169th, 17.7) and South Sudan (171st, 11.8) at the bottom.
- **The conflict in the Middle East and the resulting energy inflation will test the strength of social fabrics, particularly in countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, Morocco, Tunisia, and Malaysia.** The SRI helps measure vulnerabilities to such exogenous shocks: countries with weaker resilience and limited fiscal buffers could be particularly affected by higher- for- longer energy prices. Indeed, sustained energy- price increases raise inflation (including food inflation), weaken growth and heighten political tensions, particularly where societies have limited capacity to respond. Coping mechanisms will be the pivotal, including crisis- response mechanisms, economic stabilizers, and optionality. Two clusters stand out: Low-to-mid resilience economies with high exposure – including Vietnam, Thailand, Morocco, Tunisia and Malaysia – could see price spikes more easily translate into social pressures. Meanwhile moderate- resilience countries with medium exposure to the energy price shock – including Chile, Egypt, Serbia and South Korea – should be in a better position to cushion the impact of a temporary energy shock on social resilience. Europe is likely to be more affected than the US given its greater reliance on imported energy, though social spending may cushion the impact.
- **Taking the long view, four trajectories of global progress in social resilience emerge: low-resilience countries catching up (e.g., Romania and Saudi Arabia); countries weakening further (e.g., Nigeria and Brazil); high-resilience countries consolidating strength (e.g., Germany and Finland); and countries experiencing slippage (e.g., Canada and Sweden). Some countries seem stuck in a middle-social-resilience trap among these diverging paths.** Rankings show limited change since 2024, though Sri Lanka (+12.7pts; +39 ranks) and India (+7.8pts; +27 ranks) improved notably, while Brazil (-8.7pts; -41 ranks) and the Czech Republic (-6.9pts; -15 ranks) saw

steep declines. A cluster of advanced economies persistently scoring 65-70 – including Czechia, Hungary, Italy, the US and Japan – appears caught in a middle-SRI trap (in reference to the middle-income trap phenomenon coined by Indermit Gill and Homi Kharas in 2007). Material prosperity increasingly coexists with political polarization and policy volatility. Prolonged stagnation in this range risks greater instability, weaker reform capacity and declining policy predictability, with implications for long-term growth and sovereign risk. These tensions are increasingly visible: between 2020 and 2025, mid-resilience countries – including India, Indonesia, South Korea, the UK and the US - accounted for up to 70% of global strikes, riots and civil commotion (SRCC) events.

- **Social resilience matters for macroeconomic performance, capital-market development and sovereign risk.** For investors and policymakers alike, the SRI functions an both early-warning system and reform compass. Higher resilience is associated with stronger real GDP per capita growth. In high-income economies, higher SRI levels also correlate with deeper capital markets, suggesting stronger market stability and investor confidence. Sovereign exposure, contract frustration and operational disruption are distinct in their mechanics but interconnected in their root cause: low and deteriorating social resilience. Sharp deteriorations in the SRI have preceded episodes of sovereign stress by 12-24 months. Recoveries tend to be asymmetric, with resilience gains often preceding spread compression as markets reprice structural repair with a lag. Social resilience is not a one-way street: declines can be reversed where institutional credibility is strengthened, polarization reduced and opportunity broadened, whereas reliance on short-term fixes risks gradual erosion. For investors, tracking both the level and momentum of the SRI sharpens sovereign risk assessment and helps anticipate structural turning points; for policymakers, sustained reform rather than reactive crisis management remains central to rebuilding long-term resilience.

Uneven and polarized:
resilience consolidates, slowly

Global social resilience gaps remain wide – and structurally entrenched. Social resilience is not merely a social or political concern; it is increasingly a determinant of economic performance and financial stability. Countries with stronger institutions, cohesive societies and lower polarization tend to deliver more predictable policies, more stable growth and lower macro-financial volatility, while weaker resilience is associated with policy uncertainty, reform paralysis and higher risk premia. Against this background, our Social Resilience Index (SRI) assesses 171 jurisdictions on a scale from 0 (lowest resilience) to 100 (highest), aggregating 12 indicators spanning economic fundamentals, social cohesion and institutional and external strength. This year, the global headline SRI score increased only marginally to 47.9 from 47.4 in last edition of the SRI ranking in 2024. This 0.5pt improvement masks persistent divergence across regions (Figure 1). High-income economies remain the clear leaders, with an average score of 70.5 in 2025 – unchanged from 2024 and virtually identical to their 2005 level (70.6). The gap between high-income economies (70.5) and Africa (34.4) exceeds 36 points, underscoring the structural nature of global resilience inequality.

Figure 1: Global evolution of the Social Resilience Index by region 2005-2025



Sources: Allianz Research

Short-term resilience dynamics remain modest in aggregate but diverge across regions, revealing renewed momentum in parts of Asia and stagnation or reversal elsewhere. High-income economies in Europe and North America remained stable at the top of the ranking with a SRI score of 70.5, unchanged compared with 2024. Emerging Asia recorded the most visible improvement, rising from 42.4 in 2024 to 44.3 in 2025, supported by broad-based growth and institutional stabilization. The Middle East edged up from 53.5 to 53.8, maintaining a mid-tier position. By contrast, Emerging Europe declined slightly from 48.9 to 48.4, while Latin America softened from 44.5 to 44.2 despite the earlier post-pandemic recovery. Africa improved only marginally from 34.1 to 34.4 and remains below its 2005 level of 35.9, highlighting persistent structural fragility. While year-on-year changes are modest, the dispersion across regions remains substantial and persistent over time.

High-income countries recorded the highest levels of social resilience in 2025, led by Northern Europe[1]. Finland ranks first with a score of 84.3, Denmark second (83.8) and Iceland third (81.4). Among advanced economies, Germany (8th, 78.5), France (13th, 74.7) and the UK (18th, 72.9) are in the leading group of countries in the ranking, while Spain (27th, 66.9), Italy (28th, 66.8) the US (32nd, 65.3) and Poland (34th, 64.9) sit in the upper-mid tier. Among emerging economies, the United Arab Emirates (5th, 79.3) records one of the highest social resilience levels globally, while Saudi Arabia (38th, 63.2) ranks in the upper-mid of the distribution. By contrast, large emerging markets such as China (59th, 52.5), India (81st, 46.8), Mexico (105th, 41.3) and Brazil (112th, 40.0) are placed markedly lower in the ranking. At the bottom of the ranking are conflict-affected states, such as Lebanon (169th, 17.7), Democratic Republic of Congo (170th, 16.7) and South Sudan (171st, 11.8).

While the ranking has remained broadly stable for most countries since the last edition of the SRI in 2024, some short-term shifts are particularly noteworthy. Sri Lanka posted the strongest improvement (+12.7pts), climbing 39 ranks from 153rd to 114th, followed by India (+7.8pts), rising 27 positions from 108th to 81st, and China (+4.0pts), which advanced 15 places from 74th to 59th. By contrast, Brazil recorded the steepest deterioration (-8.7pts), falling 41 ranks from 71st to 112th; the Czech Republic dropped 15 places from 20th to 35th (-6.9pts), and Chile slid 30 ranks from 61st to 91st (-5.9pts).

Economic fundamentals are currently – and perhaps surprisingly – the weakest pillar of global resilience, with a global average score of 43.3, indicating that the recent slowdown in global growth and softer labor markets have weighed on the SRI (Figure 2). High-income economies perform considerably better (62.2), supported by stronger labor market participation and fiscal capacity, while structurally weaker regions such as Africa (33.4) and Emerging Asia (34.4) remain constrained by weaker growth dynamics and limited fiscal buffers. At the country level, strong economic fundamentals underpin resilience in Germany and the Nordic economies, while persistent macroeconomic instability and fiscal pressures weigh on South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Brazil and Türkiye. Meanwhile, social cohesion – with a global average of 49.2 – remains the primary differentiator between advanced and emerging economies. High-income countries record the highest cohesion levels globally (83.7), reflecting dense welfare systems and stronger institutional trust, as illustrated by Finland, Denmark and Germany. Emerging Europe also maintains relatively strong cohesion (67.4), particularly in Poland, Romania and Serbia, where employment gains and social transfers have supported stability. By contrast, Latin America posts the lowest cohesion score globally (30.5), reflecting structural inequality, informality, crime and limited trust in state institutions; countries such as Brazil, Guatemala and Colombia rank among the weakest in this dimension, and repeated protest cycles in Chile and Peru have tested institutional credibility. Institutional strength has shown limited upward momentum in recent years (48.2 globally), while external strength has become the broadest pillar of resilience (54.6 globally). This partly reflects short-term effects of a fragmenting global economy shifting from highly efficient global supply chains toward more regional and politically aligned ones. The medium-term effects of this shift from efficiency to resilience warrant caution as higher costs and weaker productivity could ultimately weigh on social resilience. In several countries, resilience has shifted from growth-driven to buffer-based stabilization – reducing exposure to sudden external shocks, but not necessarily strengthening long-term structural capacity.

1 The full SRI country ranking for 171 countries is provided in Appendix Table 1.

Figure 2: Drivers of SRI scores by region in 2025



Sources: Allianz Research

Zooming out to a longer time horizon reveals substantial divergences among geographical areas. For the first time, we have reconstructed the SRI back to 2005, allowing us to identify not only current resilience levels but also secular trends and turning points over two decades. The global average has increased only modestly, from 46.3 in 2005 to 47.9 in 2025. High-income economies have remained broadly flat over the period (70.6 vs 70.5), confirming their structural plateau at a high level. The Middle East improved from 50.1 to 53.8, while Emerging Asia rose from 39.8 to 44.3, marking the strongest long-term gain among regions. Latin America recorded a more moderate increase from 40.4 to 44.2, though with visible cyclical setbacks along the way. Emerging Europe advanced from 43.9 to 48.4 before recent moderation. Africa, by contrast, declined overall from 35.9 to 34.4, remaining structurally at the lower end of the distribution. Despite major global shocks – including the financial crisis, the pandemic and the energy shock – the relative distance between regions has narrowed only marginally. Social resilience therefore evolves cumulatively and unevenly, with structural gaps persisting across regions.

Switching to a medium-term perspective, the period from the eve of the Covid-19 pandemic until today shows gradual adjustment amid longer-term scarring. Between 2020 and 2025, the global average increased from 47.1 to 47.9, reflecting gradual recovery from the pandemic shock. High-income economies rose only marginally from 70.3 to 70.5, underscoring limited additional strengthening at the top. The Middle East improved from 53.0 to 53.8, while Emerging Asia recorded a more pronounced increase from 43.3 to 44.3, recently moving back above its pre-pandemic level. Latin America rebounded from 42.4 in 2020 to 44.2 in 2025, recovering from its 2019-20 trough linked to social unrest and institutional stress. In contrast, Emerging Europe declined from 49.9 in 2020 to 48.4, reflecting geopolitical strain and slower post-pandemic momentum. Africa improved only modestly from 33.6 to 34.4, remaining below its 2005 level. Overall, convergence since the pandemic has been gradual and uneven, with some regions regaining lost ground but few achieving a decisive structural break.

Figure 3: Drivers of SRI scores by region in 2025



Sources: Allianz Research

Relating long-term (since 2005) and medium-term (since 2020) changes in the SRI to the most recent movements of the index (2025 vs. 2024) reveals clear regional differentiation (Figure 3). Emerging Asia stands out as the only region improving consistently across all three horizons, outpacing other regions through stronger economic performance and gradual gains in social welfare and institutional capacity. Emerging Europe and the Middle East both show positive long-term trajectories, but their medium-term momentum has weakened: resilience has stagnated in the Middle East and declined in Emerging Europe, where institutional pressures and geopolitical strains have weighed on recent performance. Latin America posts gains over the medium- and long-term, while remaining broadly stable in the short-term. By contrast, high-income economies show limited movement across all horizons, consolidating their structural lead at the top of the global resilience ranking.

Energy price shock triggered by conflict in the Middle East will put resilience gains to the test

The conflict in the Middle East and the resulting surge in energy prices will test the strength of social fabrics across countries[2]. As oil and gas prices surge and supply chains face disruptions – particularly through shipping routes such as the Strait of Hormuz – sustained increases in energy prices could feed into higher inflation, weaker growth and rising political tensions. The SRI helps identify such vulnerabilities by capturing the structural ability of economies and institutions to absorb exogenous shocks. Countries with weaker resilience and limited fiscal buffers are particularly vulnerable, as higher energy costs quickly translate into higher living costs and food inflation where societies have limited capacity to respond. In this context, coping mechanisms – including crisis response capacity, automatic stabilizers and policy optionality – will be pivotal. Among advanced economies, Europe is likely to be more affected than the US given its greater reliance on imported energy, although stronger social spending may cushion part of the impact.

Figure 4 provides a forward-looking perspective by mapping countries' SRI levels against their exposure to food and fuel import shocks. The horizontal axis shows SRI levels in 2025, while the vertical axis measures resilience in food and fuel supply: higher values indicate greater resilience and therefore lower exposure to price shocks. Figure 3 Panel A highlights two clusters among advanced economies. A first green cluster combines upper-middle to high SRI levels with relatively low exposure, reflecting either greater energy independence – as in the US – or strong institutional resilience despite higher import dependence, as in Denmark and Finland. A second yellow cluster groups countries with medium SRI and medium-to-high exposure, including Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, Hungary and Portugal, where resilience remains relatively solid but exposure to energy price shocks is more pronounced. Among lower- and mid-resilience economies, exposure to food and fuel imports creates a clearer gradient of vulnerability. Figure 3 Panel B shows three clusters, largely composed of emerging markets. A first yellow cluster – similar to the mid-resilience group in advanced economies – includes Poland and Czechia, which combine SRI levels around 65 with moderate exposure and therefore appear relatively well positioned to absorb a temporary shock. A second orange cluster – including Chile, Egypt, Serbia and South Korea – combines moderate resilience with medium exposure to energy price shocks. These countries should be better positioned to cushion the impact of a temporary energy shock on social resilience. The third red cluster represents the most vulnerable group: low-to-mid resilience economies with high exposure, including Vietnam, Thailand, Morocco, Tunisia and Malaysia, where energy price spikes could more easily translate into social pressures.

Ultimately, the broader macroeconomic and political effects of an energy price shock could amplify existing social vulnerabilities and increase the risk of instability. Higher energy prices may translate into weaker growth, persistent inflation and higher-for-longer interest rates, weighing on economic fundamentals and potentially aggravating existing distributional conflicts. In countries heading into major elections, these pressures could become a focal point for political contestation and social

2 The conflict that began on 28 February 2026 following the US and Israel's attack on Iran is not reflected in the 2025 SRI results presented in this report.

unrest. Even in the case of the US, for example, a 10-cent increase in the price of gasoline historically leads to a 0.6% drop in the president's approval rating[3]. In parts of the Middle East, disruptions to tourism-driven prosperity could also strain social contracts. Overall, the analysis suggests that energy price shocks tend to amplify structural vulnerabilities already captured by the SRI rather than create new ones, making underlying resilience the key determinant

Figure 4: Social resilience and exposure to energy price shocks

Panel A. High-SRI countries



Sources: Allianz Research

Panel B. Low-to-medium SRI countries



Sources: Allianz Research

3 Sources: Gupta, R., C. Pierdzioch, A.K. Tiwari (2025), "Gasoline Prices and Presidential Approval Ratings of the United States", American Politics Research, September 2025 https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X251325458; Harbridge, L., J.A. Krosnick, J.M. Wooldridge (2016), "Presidential Approval and Gas Prices: Sociotropic or Pocketbook Influence?", Political Psychology.

Structural drivers: policy uncertainty rises while liberal democracies decline

As this year's report takes a longer historical perspective on social resilience, it is useful to consider two structural forces shaping the global environment in which resilience evolves: rising economic policy uncertainty and the rise of authoritarian regimes worldwide. These trends are distinct but increasingly interconnected. Higher global uncertainty can trigger diverse domestic responses, including the emergence of charismatic or strongman leadership styles promising stability or protection. In turn, political systems characterized by concentrated power or personalized leadership can reinforce polarization and institutional fragmentation, shaping the trajectory of social resilience across countries.

Figure 5 illustrates the long-term evolution of global economic policy uncertainty (EPU), based on the widely used index[4]. The index measures policy uncertainty by tracking the frequency of newspaper articles containing terms related to the economy, policy and uncertainty across major economies, combined with information on tax-code expirations and economic forecaster disagreement. Over the past two decades, the index shows a clear upward trend. While spikes were previously associated with major shocks such as the 9/11 attacks or the Global Financial Crisis, today's baseline level of policy uncertainty is structurally higher than those earlier peaks. Recent surges have reflected geopolitical tensions, trade conflicts and political polarization, with one of the latest spikes occurring around the announcement of the "Liberation Day" tariffs in April 2025.

Figure 5: Economic policy uncertain worldwide, 2000-2025

Source: Baker et al. (2016), LSEG Workspace, Allianz Research

At the same time, the global distribution of political regimes has shifted markedly. Data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, shown in Figure 6, indicate a gradual decline in the number of liberal democracies since the early 2000s, alongside a rise in various forms of autocratic governance[5]. V-Dem classifies regimes based on indicators covering electoral integrity, civil liberties, rule of law and constraints on executive power. A particularly notable category is that of electoral autocracies – systems where elections are formally held but key democratic safeguards, such as media freedom, judicial independence or opposition rights, are significantly constrained. The visible shift around 2017 is largely driven by V-Dem's reclassification of India – the world's largest democracy by population – as an electoral autocracy, reflecting sustained declines in indicators such as media freedom, civil society autonomy and constraints on executive power.

4 Source: Baker, S., N. Bloom and S. Davis (2016), "Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(4), 1593-1636, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw024.

5 Source: Coppedge, M. et al. (2024), Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset v14, Varieties of Democracy Institute, University of Gothenburg, https://www.v-dem.net/data/the-v-dem-dataset/.

Taken together, these trends point to a more uncertain and politically fragmented global environment. Part of this shift reflects the broader transition from a highly integrated global economy toward more regionalized and geopolitically aligned economic structures as supply chains adapt to geopolitical tensions. In such contexts, domestic political dynamics may amplify underlying social pressures: when economic opportunity, social mobility or institutional performance are perceived to weaken, societies may become more receptive to nationalist or populist leadership narratives. These dynamics do not determine social resilience directly, but they help shape the broader structural backdrop against which resilience evolves across countries..

Figure 6: Share of the world population living in democracies and autocracies, 2000-2025



Source: Baker et al. (2016), LSEG Workspace, Allianz Research

Four clusters of social resilience

Over the long-term, there has been a gradual catch-up and resilience improved globally from 46.3 in 2005 to 47.9 in 2025 – but trajectories across regions and countries are heterogeneous along four structurally differentiated paths. Plotting 2005 SRI levels against long-term changes in SRI reveals four distinct clusters (Figure 7). The analysis shows that resilience is path-dependent but dynamic, and not income-determined. Both convergence and erosion occur among both high- and low-income countries, and institutional momentum – positive or negative – shapes long-term resilience.

1. Low-resilience countries catching up. Starting from weak institutional and economic baselines, these countries record sustained cumulative gains. Romania and Serbia benefited from EU alignment, FDI-led industrial upgrading and improvements in public administration. Saudi Arabia diversified beyond hydrocarbons and modernized regulatory environments, raising institutional and economic resilience even as social reforms remain uneven. Azerbaijan, Côte d'Ivoire and the Dominican Republic combined stronger growth, improved macroeconomic management and infrastructure investment with institutional consolidation and policy predictability. These cases illustrate how reform momentum, external integration and institutional upgrading can gradually lift structural resilience.

2. Low-resilience countries deteriorating. These countries combine fragile starting positions with ongoing institutional or macroeconomic erosion. Nigeria remains vulnerable due to underinvestment, governance constraints and high poverty, leaving resilience exposed to oil-price volatility and security risks. Egypt faces persistent inflation, repeated IMF programs and geopolitical tensions, while South Africa struggles with weak growth, high unemployment and governance strain. Brazil's institutions are relatively strong, but low productivity growth, polarization and security concerns limit resilience. Türkiye faces sticky inflation, limited fiscal space and tight monetary conditions. Russia stabilized briefly through capital controls and energy revenues after 2014 and 2022, but sanctions, isolation and war-related fiscal and demographic pressures are now weakening resilience. Across these economies, macroeconomic volatility and institutional rigidities reinforce each other, constraining resilience.

3. High-resilience countries improving. These countries already had strong systems and have made further progress on social cohesion, institutional strength and policy adaptability. Germany and Finland sustained fiscal credibility, social cohesion and governance effectiveness through successive shocks, while the United Arab Emirates combined institutional modernization with a strengthening of its external position. These cases demonstrate that resilience can be reinforced even from high starting levels when institutional depth and reform capacity are preserved.

4. High-resilience countries deteriorating. These advanced economies show signs of structural erosion despite solid macro frameworks. Canada, Sweden, Greece and New Zealand have seen declines in institutional trust or social cohesion, reflecting polarization, reform fatigue and distributional tensions. Among the 19 countries clustered around an SRI score of 70, 16 declined this year and seven remain below pre-pandemic levels despite cyclical recovery. This suggests a "hidden scarring" from the 2020–2022 shock: while output, employment and corporate balance sheets have largely recovered, institutional trust and social cohesion have weakened. In several economies, the pandemic and cost-of-living crisis eroded confidence in expert authority, heightened perceptions of unfairness and widened generational and regional divides. The slippage of even top-tier economies highlights a key finding of this report: resilience is not permanent and can deteriorate under compound shocks, with implications for political stability, policy predictability and long-term investment risk.

Figure 7: SRI level in 2005 vs. long-term changes 2005-2025, selected countries



Sources: Allianz Research

While the long-term picture reveals clear secular trends across countries that can be grouped into structural clusters, the medium-term dynamics since 2020 are far less uniform and considerably more fragmented. Figure 8 plots medium-term movements in social resilience since the pandemic in 2020 against the short-term change since 2024, showing dispersed results across countries. Within each region, trajectories have diverged markedly: some economies consolidated post-pandemic stabilization, while others slipped back amid political volatility, inflation pressures or reform fatigue. Latin America illustrates this fragmentation: although the region shows the strongest medium-term rebound since 2020 (+1.8pts), several large economies remain structurally constrained and vulnerable to renewed stress. Emerging Asia has returned above its pre-pandemic level at the aggregate level (+1.0pt since 2020), but underlying institutional and social cohesion paths vary significantly across countries. Europe, despite high starting levels, underperformed in the short term (-1.5pts in Emerging Europe since 2020), reflecting geopolitical strain and uneven institutional adjustment.

The post-pandemic period therefore reinforces a central conclusion of this report: resilience adjusts slowly in aggregate but can diverge rapidly at the country level. Medium-term movements are shaped less by structural convergence and more by domestic policy choices, geopolitical exposure and institutional credibility – factors that can alter sovereign risk profiles within relatively short horizons.

The long timeframes required to improve resilience also apply to several high-income economies: several markets are now facing a "middle-SRI trap", which is accompanied by greater polarization and marked political alternation – in reference to the middle-income trap phenomenon coined by Indermit Gill and Homi Kharas in 2007[6]. High-income countries that remain around an SRI of 65-70 for too long may turn toward nationalist or populist leaders, reflecting underlying dissatisfaction with economic opportunity, social mobility or institutional performance (see Figure 9). This typically coincides with rising political volatility, weaker reform capacity and declining policy predictability, with negative

6 Source: Kharas, H. and I. Gill (2007), An East Asian Renaissance: Ideas for Economic Growth, World Bank, http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6798.

ramifications for economic growth and sovereign risk. In countries such as Czechia and Hungary, relatively weaker scores on institutional checks and balances, media freedom and minority protections have coincided with the rise and consolidation of governments that emphasize national sovereignty, cultural conservatism and skepticism toward supranational constraints (e.g. the EU). Italy and the US have seen repeated electoral successes for parties or leaders promising to protect "insiders" from globalization, migration and perceived elite capture, mirroring the frustration of segments of the population who feel left behind despite high average income levels. Even in Japan, where political turnover is more contained and social cohesion relatively strong, low growth, demographic pressures and persistent concerns over stagnation have made nationalist narratives and calls for a more assertive security posture more salient. These cases suggest that when structurally high-income societies cannot translate wealth into broad-based opportunity and trust, political demand for disruptive, populist or nationalist alternatives grows and protests become more frequent and lasting.

Figure 8: SRI medium-term (post-pandemic) and short-term evolution, selected countries



Sources: Allianz Research

Figure 9: Selected countries with middle-SRI scores



Sources: Allianz Research

Social unrest: Just the tip of the iceberg

Historically, mass protests have emerged as one of the most visible indicators of social and political stress across both high income and emerging markets. From the streets of Berlin and Paris to the squares of Islamabad and Dhaka, citizens have increasingly taken to public spaces to voice grievances ranging from economic inequality and democratic backsliding to climate policy and government corruption. It has been estimated that a nationwide protest capable of blocking economic activities for more than 24 hours can shave off 0.2pp from GDP[7] .

However, protest activity represents only the visible tip of a broader iceberg of potential business and operational disruption. The additional risk dimensions assessed later in this report – encompassing factors such as supply-chain exposure, political risk and institutional volatility – must be read alongside the protest data to form a complete picture. Taken together, the overall framework allows us to flag countries where social unrest is a meaningful but manageable risk factor, particularly among high and upper mid-SRI states where institutional buffers remain operative. The calculus shifts materially, however, in contexts characterized by very low resilience and weak voice and accountability: here, protest events are less likely to be contained within established channels and more likely to translate into sustained, highly disruptive episodes with direct consequences for business continuity. Countries that saw at least four major strikes, riots and civil commotion (SRCC) events involving more than 1,000 people and lasting more than one day between 2020 and 2025 have been grouped into three SRI tiers for comparative purposes.

7 Source: Baker, S., N. Bloom and S. Davis (2016), "Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(4), 1593-1636, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw024.

Figure 10: Map of reported events in 2015-2025 with active participation exceeding 1,000 people and lasting more than one day, the darker the higher



Source: Carnegie Endowment, Allianz Research

Figure 11: SRCC events and SRI changes, selected countries sorted by SRI level



Source: Carnegie Endowment, Allianz Research

High-SRI countries: Institutional stability despite protest pressure

Germany, France and the UK – all scoring above 70 on the SRI – recorded a modest four to five significant protest events each over the review period. This relatively contained protest frequency, combined with stable or marginally improving SRI scores, suggests that in high-resilience democracies, public mobilization tends to operate within established channels and does not fundamentally destabilize institutional order. Germany's SRI of 78.5 – the highest in the sample – reflects strong rule of law, deep social trust networks and a political culture accustomed to managed dissent. The minor uptick of 1.4pts since 2015 points to continued, if gradual, consolidation of social resilience. France and the UK show similarly stable, if marginally lower, SRI trajectories, with the latter's near-flat change of +0.1pts consistent with the post-Brexit turbulence that has weighed on institutional confidence.

Mid-SRI countries: A heterogeneous and contested middle ground

The mid-SRI tier is the most internally diverse and analytically interesting grouping, being the main contributor to protest figures globally, with around 70% SRCC events localized within this group. It spans democracies experiencing different forms of stress (Brazil, Hungary, Mexico, Slovakia and the US), newly mobilized societies in East Asia and the Caucasus (South Korea, Georgia, Albania) and economically volatile states in Latin America and Southeast Asia (Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, Ecuador, Indonesia). The United States, with eight protests recorded – the joint-highest within this tier alongside Indonesia – shows in parallel only a modest SRI increase over the past decade. India stands out with six recorded protest events and an SRI of 46.8; it has nonetheless registered the largest positive SRI shift in the entire sample, at +16.6pts since 2015, distancing itself from neighboring Bangladesh and Pakistan, which remain in the low-SRI segment. The SRI performance reflects measurable gains in state capacity and economic integration metrics, though civil liberties indicators remain contested. A similarly sharp upward trajectory appears in Tunisia (+13.5pts) and Peru (+12.6pts), though both countries continue to face acute governance fragility and population is much smaller. At the other end of the mid-tier, Slovakia and Ecuador have seen SRI declines of 5.9pts and 2.2pts respectively, pointing to deteriorating institutional environments that merit monitoring. Indonesia leads the mid-tier in protest frequency at nine events, yet maintains an SRI of 45.9 with a positive trajectory (+6.1pts). This combination may reflect a democratizing society in which civic mobilization is itself a sign of growing political engagement rather than systemic instability.

Low-SRI countries: High protest intensity, fragile state structures

The three low-SRI countries – Iran (38.1), Bangladesh (30.8) and Pakistan (27.0) – present the starkest case for the relationship between state fragility and protest intensity. Pakistan, with 11 recorded protest events, records both the highest protest frequency and the lowest SRI in the sample. Its modest positive change of +6.2pts since 2015 does not yet bring it into the mid-SRI band and should be interpreted cautiously in light of continued political volatility, civil-military tensions and macroeconomic stress. Iran's SRI of 38.1, combined with six protest events, reflects a pattern of recurrent, high-stakes mobilization against a backdrop of authoritarian control. The positive SRI change of +7.9pts appears paradoxical given documented crackdowns on civil liberties, and may be driven by improvements in economic or health-related sub-indices that partially offset governance deficits. Bangladesh, with four protests and an SRI of 30.8, has seen a marginal SRI decline of 0.5pts. Its position near the boundary between the low and mid tiers warrants attention, particularly in light of recent political transitions and their potential downstream effects on institutional stability.

Skating on thin ice

The data reveal a broadly consistent, if nuanced, relationship between social resilience and the frequency and character of protest activity. High-SRI countries tend to experience fewer large-scale mobilizations, and when they do occur, institutional frameworks appear better equipped to accommodate and channel dissent without systemic rupture. Low-SRI environments, by contrast, are characterized by higher protest frequency alongside weaker state capacity to manage social conflict, amplifying both the probability and the potential consequences of instability.

The SRI change variable introduces a critical temporal dimension. Countries that have improved resilience over the past decade – even from a low base – may be developing the institutional buffers necessary to better manage future social pressures. Conversely, states with declining SRI scores, regardless of their current tier, face a compounding risk: weakening institutions coinciding with heightened mobilization creates conditions in which protest can more readily escalate beyond manageable thresholds. Decision makers should treat protest frequency not merely as a symptom to be managed, but as a diagnostic signal. Where mobilization coincides with declining resilience, early investment in institutional capacity, social trust and inclusive economic policy may prove far less costly than reactive crisis management

Macro-financial and country-risk relevance of social resilience

Relating social resilience to macroeconomic and financial outcomes is conceptually challenging because these variables co-evolve and may influence each other in both directions. The relationships presented in this section should therefore be interpreted as correlations rather than causal effects. Stronger economic growth and stable financial conditions can improve social outcomes and institutional trust, thereby strengthening social resilience. At the same time, more resilient societies – characterized by stronger institutions, social cohesion and policy credibility – may support macroeconomic stability, reduce risk aversion and encourage investment and capital-market development. In other words, reverse causality is possible and likely, as resilience and macro-financial conditions evolve together over time. Moreover, the SRI captures structural social and institutional conditions that typically change slowly, whereas many macroeconomic and financial indicators fluctuate at a much higher frequency.

To account for these differences, the analysis focuses on within-country correlations over longer horizons, relating changes in resilience to structural macro-financial variables rather than short-term cyclical movements. While the results should not be interpreted as evidence of causality, they nevertheless provide useful insights into the co-movement and long-term interaction between social resilience, macroeconomic performance and country risk across economies.

A broad academic and policy literature suggests that social cohesion, institutional stability and political polarization can have meaningful macro-financial consequences. Higher political fragmentation and policy uncertainty tend to increase economic uncertainty, raising risk premia and discouraging investment and hiring[8]. In such environments, firms and households often postpone spending decisions and financial markets demand higher compensation for risk[9]. Empirical studies also link institutional quality and political stability to stronger growth performance and improved investment dynamics. For example, cross-country research finds that institutional quality is positively associated with long-term economic growth, while instability and governance weaknesses tend to weigh on investment and capital accumulation[10]. Taken together, these findings suggest that diminished social cohesion, institutional fragility and polarization are not only political phenomena but also macro-financial risk factors that can influence growth trajectories, capital formation and sovereign risk.

Across world regions and over time, improvements in social resilience are positively associated with stronger long-term real GDP per capita growth, although the relationship remains modest and far from mechanical. This link is not circular: growth enters the SRI only as a short-term deviation from a country's long-run growth trend, whereas the growth variable used here reflects secular long-term growth performance. Overall,

8 Source: Baker, S., N. Bloom, and S. Davis (2016), "Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty," Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(4), 1593–1636; M. Azzimonti (2018), "Partisan Conflict and Private Investment," Journal of Monetary Economics 93, 114–131.

9 Source: Bloom, N. (2009), "The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks," Econometrica 77(3), 623–685; Kempf, E. and M. Tsoutsoura (2024), "Political Polarization and Finance," Annual Review of Financial Economics, 16, 121–148.

10 Source: Alesina, A., S. Özler, N. Roubini, and P. Swagel (1996), "Political Instability and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Growth 1(2), 189–211; J. Duca and J. Saving (2016), "Income Inequality and Political Polarization: Time Series Evidence over Nine Decades," Review of Income and Wealth 62(3), 445–466.

the evidence suggests that resilience improvements tend to coincide with stronger long-term growth outcomes, particularly in emerging economies, though structural factors such as institutional quality, economic fundamentals and external vulnerabilities remain important drivers. The relationship is strongest in emerging markets, where a 1pt (10pts) increase in the SRI corresponds to roughly +0.1% (+1%) higher long-term GDP per capita growth per year. In high-income economies, the association is smaller, with a 1pt (10pts) increase corresponding to about +0.05% (+0.5%) higher growth (R^2 = 0.0257). Regionally, the relationship appears somewhat stronger in Emerging Asia, where a 10pts increase in resilience corresponds to roughly +0.6% higher growth (R^2 = 0.0858). India stands out as a positive outlier, combining robust long-term growth (+5.7%) with large resilience gains, while Vietnam represents a divergence case, posting strong growth despite declining resilience. The relationship becomes more pronounced in Latin America (R^2 = 0.1767), where a 10pts increase in resilience corresponds to about +0.9% higher growth, illustrated by the Dominican Republic, and is strongest in Africa, where a 10pts increase in SRI is associated with roughly +1.5% higher GDP per capita growth.

Figure 12: Correlation of SRI changes 2015-2025 and average real GDP p.c. 2015-2025, by region

Panel A: High-income economies



Sources: LSEG Workspace, Allianz Research

Panel B: Emerging Asia



Sources: LSEG Workspace, Allianz Research

Panel C: Latin America



Sources: LSEG Workspace, Allianz Research

Panel D: Africa



Sources: LSEG Workspace, Allianz Research

Social resilience can be associated with greater financial market depth, measured at the country level as the sum of outstanding government bonds and stock market capitalization relative to GDP. This metric is an approximation of long-term development of financial market depth. We focus on public traded assets (bonds and equity) and do not consider the financial intermediation by the banking sector. In many advanced economies, deeper and more sophisticated financial markets co-evolve with broader social and institutional development, reflecting stronger legal frameworks, better contract enforcement and more effective risk-sharing. However, social resilience should not be interpreted as a sufficient condition for deep financial markets as much as deep financial markets are not necessarily sign of social resilience. Many specific factors can come into play. In economies where small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) dominate production, bank-based lending often remains the primary funding channel. Legal and regulatory barriers, along with cultural attitudes toward risk, further shape the structure of the financial system. In more risk-averse societies, agents may preferentially allocate savings into bank deposits and insurance products rather than traded assets, which slows financial market deepening without necessarily implying weaker underlying economic potential. But well-developed financial intermediation can enhance resilience as it increases the capacity of households, firms and governments to absorb and recover from shocks by mobilizing savings, providing access to liquidity and credit. The link between financial development and social resilience is mutually reinforcing and primarily correlational rather than strictly causal. Consequently, relating changes in the SRI to financial market depth should be interpreted as suggestive and illustrative rather than as providing a fully analytical causal assessment.

Across advanced economies, improvements in resilience correlate positively with changes in market depth. The estimated slope suggests that a 10pts increase in SRI corresponds to roughly a +2.8% annual increase in capital-market depth over the long-run, while the explanatory power remains moderate (R^2 = 0.083). Country examples illustrate both the alignment and limits of this relationship. Romania combines one of the strongest resilience improvements with a marked increase in financial market depth, reflecting the rapid development of its capital market and growing participation on the Bucharest Stock Exchange[11]. By contrast, Switzerland experienced resilience gains despite a slight decline in market depth, while New Zealand recorded falling resilience even as financial depth increased modestly. These cases highlight that financial development and resilience are related but not mechanically linked, as regulatory frameworks and domestic financial dynamics also play an important role.

11 Source: OECD (2022), "Capital Market Review of Romania: Towards a National Strategy", OECD Capital Market Series, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9bfc0339-en.

Figure 13: Correlation of SRI changes 2015-2025 and capital market depth changes 2015-2025, high-income economies



Sources: LSEG Workspace, Allianz Research

Beyond macroeconomic and financial market outcomes, the SRI may also serve as an early warning indicator that foreshadows systemic crises, while revealing recovery asymmetries in which societies rebound faster than their sovereigns. While protests and social unrest represent the most visible manifestations of compromised social resilience, they constitute only one tip of the iceberg. Capturing latent risks and emerging signals across diverse geographies may help identify key threats before they materialize into crisis events. For example, marked deterioration in SRI scores or persistently low levels can foreshadow broader systemic crises and spikes in country risk (see purple-circled countries in Figure 14). These deteriorating trends often precede sovereign defaults, political instability or economic collapse by 12-24 months, providing a critical window for risk mitigation. Notably, improvements in social resilience tend to outpace the normalization of sovereign risk spreads following defaults or crises (see yellow-circled countries in Figure 14). This divergence reveals that societies possess fundamental adaptive capacities that enable them to recover more rapidly than their governments' creditworthiness – a crucial insight for investors with longer time horizons.

Figure 14: SRI level and country risk premium trends, selected countries



Sources: Damodaran, Allianz Research

A three-dimensional risk framework for investors. This future outlook is particularly relevant for trade partnerships and infrastructure-related capital that are exposed to political violence, arbitrary measures (confiscation, expropriation and nationalization) or strikes, riots and civil commotion (SRCC) events leading to outright business interruption. From a foreign investor perspective, low social resilience goes in parallel with a multi-layered risk matrix:

1. Sovereign Risk: Low SRI scores frequently correlate with elevated sovereign default risk, currency instability and capital controls, which are particularly frequent in Africa, South-Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

2. Contract Frustration Risk: Weak social resilience can increase the likelihood of investor-state disputes, particularly around large or politically sensitive projects. Governments under social pressure may seek to revise, delay or unilaterally terminate contracts – especially those perceived domestically as unfair, opaque or misaligned with social and environmental priorities. This creates a higher probability of expropriation (direct or creeping), contract renegotiation and arbitration. This risk is particularly acute in extractive industries, infrastructure concessions and public-private partnerships, with Latin America as a notable example.

3. Operational Risk: Deteriorating social resilience is associated with more frequent strikes, protests, road blockades and localized violence, disrupting logistics, restricting site access, endangering staff and causing production and revenue losses. Firms may face repeated shutdowns and higher costs for security, insurance and contingency planning, while strikes, riots and civil commotion (SRCC) can have lasting effects on institutional stability and sovereign credit. Countries with limited space for voice and accountability are particularly prone to generational, anti-establishment or cost-of-living protests, as seen in China, Ecuador, Guatemala, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Russia, Serbia, Sri Lanka and Tunisia. Since 2020, protest activity has also risen in Emerging Asia (notably India, Indonesia, Pakistan and South Korea) and high-income economies such as Germany, the UK and the US, indicating that operational risks from social unrest are no longer confined to EMs.

The three risk dimensions outlined above – sovereign exposure, contract frustration and operational disruption – are distinct in their mechanics but interconnected in their root cause: low and deteriorating social resilience. For investors, the SRI's most actionable feature is its lead time, having historically anticipated sovereign stress by 12 to 24 months, offering a window to reposition before spreads widen or ratings agencies move. For companies holding infrastructure concessions, extractive licenses or public-private partnerships, that same deterioration signals a shifting political economy in which governments under social pressure will prioritize domestic legitimacy over contractual commitments – making political risk insurance and early legal safeguards essential rather than optional. For exporters and logistics-dependent businesses, the critical shift is geographic: SRCC-driven disruption is no longer an emerging-market footnote but a scenario to be stress-tested across the full operational footprint, including high-income countries where protest frequency has surged since 2020. Across all three dimensions, the SRI reframes social unrest from a reputational or contextual concern into a structured, forward-looking input to risk pricing, contract design and contingency planning.

Figure 14: Risk dimensions by region, index: 0 = lowest, 10 = highest



Sources: Damodaran, ICSID, Carnegie Endowment, World Bank, Allianz Research

Long-term strategies vs. unforeseen disruptions

Social resilience trends are not irreversible, as countries can recover through targeted policy interventions and institutional reforms that address structural vulnerabilities. Improvements in SRI scores often stem from equitable wealth distribution, reduced polarization, restored trust between citizens and institutions, and enhanced institutional adaptability to shocks. Recovery paths, however, vary based on initial conditions, political will, and external pressures. Some countries remain stuck in a middle-SRI equilibrium, marked by stagnation, while others succeed in establishing virtuous cycles of resilience-building. Case studies, such as the Baltic region's progress versus Latin America's stagnation, highlight effective strategies for escaping the mid-SRI trap and fostering resilience. These examples underscore that while challenges are universal, successful pathways require context-specific strategies tailored to local political economies and social structures.

The Baltic economies, particularly Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, have strengthened their social resilience during periods of transition, leveraging geopolitical challenges and geoeconomic fragmentation as catalysts for well-being consolidation. Estonia, in particular, has led with transformative reforms. In 2023, it introduced adaptive unemployment benefits, extending payment periods based on labor market conditions to prevent poverty during downturns. The 2024 Social Welfare Act amendments prioritized aging in place by funding home-care services, reducing reliance on institutional facilities. To address healthcare disparities, the Primary Health Care Reform expanded nurses' roles and incentivized general practitioners to serve rural areas, ensuring equitable access to care. Estonia also advanced its resilience through digital innovation and security. The 2017 launch of the world's first Data Embassy in Luxembourg safeguarded government continuity against cyber and physical threats. The 2023 National Security Concept institutionalized civil preparedness by integrating private sector IT expertise and local government responsibilities into a unified defense framework. Socially, the Adaptive Unemployment Insurance system provided an automated safety net during economic shocks, while the 2024-2025 Civil Protection Law mandated crisis-readiness training and emergency supply standards for households. These initiatives, combined with digital governance, energy independence through the REPowerEU initiative, and community-level crisis management, have created a deeply interconnected and resilient society.

Conversely, in Latin America, social resilience in many of the major countries is stagnant or declining – signaling the need for comprehensive reform and greater sustainability in the literal sense of the term, i.e., from the perspective of future generations. Economic growth rates consistently lower than the global average, the erosion of savings and pension funds to maintain purchasing power in a context of persistently high interest rates, declining real wages and increasing insecurity have weighed heavily on the SRI particularly in recent years, with several countries falling significantly in our ranking. These structural issues are deeply entrenched and difficult to resolve in the short term. The feeling of a lost decade accompanies the ongoing electoral cycles in the region, compounded by the external interference that many countries are subject to in the current geopolitical context, which further undermines institutional stability and public trust. Unlike the Baltic experience, where geopolitical

pressure catalyzed institutional innovation and social cohesion, Latin American countries have struggled to translate external challenges into opportunities for systemic reform. The fragmentation of social protection systems, inadequate investment in digital infrastructure and weak coordination between national and local governments have left populations vulnerable to both economic shocks and environmental crises. Moreover, the region faces a critical demographic transition without having built adequate institutional capacity: pension systems remain underfunded and fragmented, healthcare coverage is uneven and often excludes informal workers who constitute a large share of the labor force and educational outcomes have stagnated or declined, limiting intergenerational mobility. The lack of a unified strategic vision for resilience-building, combined with political volatility and fiscal constraints, has prevented the emergence of comprehensive frameworks comparable to those developed in the Baltic states. To reverse these trends, Latin American countries would need to prioritize long-term institutional strengthening over short-term political gains, invest in digital governance and civic preparedness and develop adaptive social protection mechanisms that can respond dynamically to economic and environmental shocks while rebuilding the social contract between governments and citizens.

In a time of increasing geoeconomic fragmentation and rapid social change, proactively addressing social resilience dynamics is crucial for long-term success. This requires shifting from reactive crisis management to proactive monitoring, recognizing that social cohesion and institutional capacity are dynamic and demand continuous evaluation. Strengthening portfolio resilience involves diversifying exposure across countries with varying SRI profiles, reducing concentration risks and integrating SRI metrics into political risk insurance and contract structuring, such as force majeure clauses and dispute resolution mechanisms. Organizations should adopt scenario-based stress tests to model business impacts under different SRI deterioration scenarios and engage proactively with stakeholders in low-SRI environments to build trust and prevent tensions. Beyond mitigating risks, identifying opportunities in countries with reforms or institutional innovation can drive long-term investment, particularly in resilience-building sectors like digital infrastructure, healthcare, education and renewable energy. Persistent declines in social resilience should prompt caution and engagement to assess whether declines are cyclical or structural and explore constructive roles for external actors. By embedding social resilience analysis into core strategies, organizations can better navigate volatility, support sustainable development and seize opportunities overlooked by those focused solely on traditional economic metrics.

Appendix: Country ranking and methodology

Appendix 1: Social Resilience Index 2025

Country	SRI 2025	Rank 2025	SRI Change 2024-2025	Rank Change 2024-2025	SRI Change 2005-2025	Rank Change 2005-2025
Finland	84,3	1	-0,7	0	0,1	2
Denmark	83,8	2	-0,7	0	-2,5	-1
Iceland	81,4	3	3,1	5	-3,7	-1
Luxembourg	79,6	4	-0,2	0	2,5	6
United Arab Emirates	79,3	5	0,0	0	6,1	12
Switzerland	79,2	6	-0,9	-3	-1,2	1
Austria	78,7	7	-0,2	-1	-1,5	1
Germany	78,5	8	-0,3	-1	1,6	3
Ireland	77,4	9	0,8	0	2,3	5
Sweden	76,9	10	3,7	7	-4,4	-6
Netherlands	76,1	11	0,5	0	-2,9	-2
Norway	76,0	12	0,2	-2	-0,7	0
France	74,7	13	-0,3	-1	0,3	2
Canada	74,0	14	-0,2	0	-7,1	-9
Estonia	73,6	15	-0,2	0	7,4	14
Kuwait	73,2	16	-0,3	0	8,5	16
New Zealand	73,1	17	-1,6	-4	-7,5	-11
United Kingdom	72,9	18	4,6	7	1,3	0
Slovenia	72,0	19	1,4	2	-2,0	-3
Qatar	70,2	20	-2,6	-2	-5,1	-7
Cyprus	69,1	21	0,2	3	0,0	3
Belgium	69,1	22	-1,2	0	-2,0	-3
Malta	69,0	23	-3,5	-4	-0,9	-2
Portugal	68,5	24	-0,5	-1	-0,9	-1
Bahamas	68,4	25	0,8	2	3,6	6
Latvia	67,7	26	0,6	2	7,8	15
Spain	66,9	27	-0,1	2	-0,4	1
Italy	66,8	28	1,1	3	3,7	9
Japan	66,6	29	-0,2	1	-3,2	-7
Australia	65,9	30	-2,4	-4	-4,9	-10
Hungary	65,8	31	0,6	2	0,0	-1
United States	65,3	32	-0,2	0	1,9	3
Lithuania	64,9	33	1,9	6	5,9	10
Poland	64,9	34	1,3	4	7,9	12
Czech Republic	64,3	35	-6,9	-15	-0,3	-2
Slovakia	63,8	36	0,1	1	-3,5	-9
Bahrain	63,7	37	-0,4	-3	5,0	7
Saudi Arabia	63,2	38	0,5	2	11,5	16
Singapore	62,3	39	-1,7	-4	2,5	3
Barbados	61,3	40	-0,4	2	-6,7	-14
Oman	61,3	41	-0,7	0	-3,3	-7
St. Lucia	61,2	42	0,5	1	7,1	6
Israel	60,6	43	5,4	10	-1,5	-4
Greece	57,8	44	1,2	4	-5,5	-8
Croatia	57,5	45	-0,9	0	-0,8	0

Country	SRI 2025	Rank 2025	SRI Change 2024-2025	Rank Change 2024-2025	SRI Change 2005-2025	Rank Change 2005-2025
Bhutan	57,1	46	6,6	16	12,2	30
Bulgaria	57,0	47	0,7	2	-4,4	-7
South Korea	56,7	48	-0,4	-1	2,6	-1
Uruguay	56,6	49	-7,2	-13	3,5	0
Romania	56,4	50	0,2	0	14,8	48
Brunei	56,3	51	-1,4	-5	-12,2	-26
Serbia	55,2	52	-0,7	-1	17,6	62
Hong Kong	54,7	53	-0,4	1	-7,5	-15
Mongolia	54,3	54	8,4	33	12,2	38
Kazakhstan	53,7	55	-5,3	-11	0,9	-4
Costa Rica	53,6	56	0,6	3	13,5	49
Timor-Leste	52,9	57	-1,1	-2	4,4	5
Azerbaijan	52,7	58	-1,0	-2	9,8	32
China	52,5	59	4,0	15	6,1	12
Albania	52,3	60	1,1	0	11,5	42
Maldives	51,7	61	-1,4	-3	15,4	55
Vanuatu	51,5	62	6,7	28	1,0	-5
Tonga	51,0	63	0,6	0	20,0	71
Montenegro	50,8	64	1,6	5	4,0	4
Moldova	50,6	65	0,7	0	4,4	7
Georgia	50,6	66	-2,6	-9	9,1	33
Bolivia	49,5	67	0,1	1	19,3	71
Belarus	49,3	68	-6,3	-16	-2,4	-13
El Salvador	49,3	69	2,1	13	4,7	10
Trinidad and Tobago	49,0	70	0,9	5	-1,0	-12
Algeria	49,0	71	1,3	7	5,7	18
Jordan	48,8	72	0,8	4	2,4	-2
North Macedonia	48,6	73	0,7	4	2,9	0
Jamaica	48,3	74	-1,9	-10	3,9	6
Peru	48,1	75	0,4	4	8,9	33
Kyrgyzstan	48,0	76	1,2	9	12,1	43
Botswana	47,9	77	-0,7	-5	0,8	-11
Tunisia	47,7	78	2,8	10	3,7	6
Armenia	47,7	79	-0,5	-5	14,8	49
Malaysia	47,4	80	5,6	18	-5,6	-30
India	46,8	81	7,8	27	1,3	-7
Cambodia	46,8	82	-0,8	-2	6,8	24
Cabo Verde	46,8	83	-1,8	-10	2,5	-1
Samoa	46,4	84	-1,0	-3	6,1	20
Indonesia	45,9	85	3,0	10	7,0	25
Tanzania	45,8	86	4,3	14	3,6	7
Fiji	45,7	87	-1,3	-4	-2,7	-24
Mauritius	45,4	88	-4,4	-22	-6,6	-35
Colombia	45,3	89	-1,6	-5	1,7	-2
Russia	45,0	90	4,0	13	-7,3	-38

Country	SRI 2025	Rank 2025	SRI Change 2024-2025	Rank Change 2024-2025	SRI Change 2005-2025	Rank Change 2005-2025
Chile	44,8	91	-5,9	-30	-4,6	-31
Belize	44,7	92	3,5	10	-0,2	-15
Solomon Islands	44,6	93	-4,9	-26	-4,1	-32
Argentina	44,2	94	-0,6	-5	-3,2	-29
Philippines	44,0	95	4,6	11	9,3	28
Bosnia and Herzegovina	43,3	96	1,1	1	-1,2	-15
Dominican Republic	43,2	97	-5,6	-27	17,4	57
Uganda	43,2	98	5,1	18	2,3	3
Benin	42,7	99	0,6	-3	-0,9	-13
Uzbekistan	42,5	100	-1,8	-9	11,5	35
Ecuador	42,1	101	-1,4	-7	6,0	16
Thailand	41,9	102	4,0	15	-3,1	-27
Morocco	41,5	103	6,4	26	4,4	12
Guyana	41,4	104	0,5	0	5,5	14
Mexico	41,3	105	-4,7	-19	1,4	2
Sao Tome and Principe	40,8	106	3,3	16	-2,1	-15
South Africa	40,7	107	1,7	2	-10,4	-51
Turkmenistan	40,5	108	5,5	22	18,5	55
Rwanda	40,5	109	1,5	2	9,1	23
Nicaragua	40,3	110	1,1	-3	12,2	36
Niger	40,1	111	-1,4	-12	-0,6	-8
Brazil	40,0	112	-8,7	-41	-9,8	-53
Panama	40,0	113	-1,4	-12	-1,5	-13
Sri Lanka	39,7	114	12,7	39	6,7	13
Egypt	39,5	115	1,6	3	-4,7	-32
Senegal	38,7	116	0,1	-4	0,3	-4
Cote d'Ivoire	38,6	117	1,1	3	10,8	32
Namibia	38,5	118	0,0	-4	-9,3	-54
Ghana	38,4	119	-0,6	-9	-0,6	-10
Libya	38,4	120	-1,2	-15	-6,4	-42
Iran	38,1	121	1,6	2	10,2	27
Mozambique	38,0	122	0,6	-1	-5,3	-34
Paraguay	37,8	123	-0,1	-4	7,2	14
Gabon	37,5	124	-0,8	-9	-4,4	-29
Vietnam	37,2	125	-6,4	-32	-1,2	-14
Iraq	36,9	126	0,7	-1	16,1	40
Congo, Rep.	36,2	127	0,7	0	4,9	6
Burkina Faso	35,8	128	-0,5	-4	-6,2	-34
Madagascar	34,9	129	5,8	19	6,2	14
Turkiye	34,9	130	-3,7	-17	-8,8	-45
Ethiopia	34,7	131	0,3	0	-6,9	-34
Equatorial Guinea	34,3	132	1,2	4	1,9	-1
Nepal	34,2	133	6,8	19	10,0	25
Malawi	34,0	134	-1,4	-6	-1,8	-14
Suriname	34,0	135	1,3	3	-0,2	-11

Country	SRI 2025	Rank 2025	SRI Change 2024-2025	Rank Change 2024-2025	SRI Change 2005-2025	Rank Change 2005-2025
Myanmar	33,8	136	8,2	23	14,1	31
Kenya	33,2	137	4,8	12	-1,5	-15
Yemen, Rep.	32,6	138	-1,4	-5	6,7	15
Guinea-Bissau	32,4	139	-0,6	-2	0,0	-9
Guatemala	32,4	140	2,9	6	3,1	2
Lesotho	32,4	141	-0,7	-6	-14,1	-72
Liberia	32,3	142	1,0	-3	4,2	3
Mali	31,6	143	0,8	-2	-10,1	-47
Sierra Leone	31,5	144	-1,7	-10	6,5	13
Guinea	31,3	145	1,1	-1	10,4	20
Cameroon	31,2	146	1,1	-1	-7,0	-33
Togo	30,9	147	0,1	-7	3,3	3
Bangladesh	30,8	148	6,7	14	3,7	3
Tajikistan	30,8	149	-5,2	-23	5,1	7
Honduras	30,1	150	-0,3	-7	7,9	12
Laos	29,6	151	0,2	-4	-1,2	-15
Djibouti	29,4	152	2,5	3	-4,1	-26
Eswatini	28,9	153	-1,6	-11	-18,1	-86
Gambia	28,2	154	-6,0	-22	4,8	5
Angola	27,6	155	0,9	1	8,7	13
Pakistan	27,0	156	0,0	-2	-6,5	-31
Haiti	27,0	157	9,4	12	5,5	7
Central African Republic	26,4	158	0,0	-1	-3,5	-17
Burundi	26,2	159	-1,7	-9	-8,6	-38
Zimbabwe	26,2	160	-1,5	-9	-1,7	-13
Comoros	25,6	161	0,4	0	8,3	8
Nigeria	25,2	162	-1,1	-4	-1,9	-10
Mauritania	25,2	163	2,2	0	-7,7	-34
Afghanistan	25,0	164	5,5	3	12,2	7
Zambia	24,1	165	-1,5	-5	-5,9	-25
Chad	23,7	166	1,5	-1	-2,0	-11
Papua New Guinea	22,4	167	-0,5	-3	-6,2	-23
Venezuela	18,3	168	6,3	3	-4,9	-8
Lebanon	17,7	169	0,2	-1	-12,4	-30
Congo, Dem. Rep.	16,7	170	-3,8	-4	0,9	0
South Sudan	11,8	171	-4,7	-1	n/a	n/a

Appendix 2: Methodology of the Social Resilience Index

We use 12 indicators for the SRI that are readily available for most countries:

1. Real GDP per capita growth trend: We compare the average annual growth in the last three years to the average growth prior to that since 2000. This approach reflects that the potential for social risk can also rise in high-income EMs (such as Chile or in the GCC) and AEs if the (relatively high) level of economic welfare is deteriorating or being perceived to deteriorate.

2. Labor force participation: The higher the share of the labor force in the working-age population, the lower the potential for discontent. This indicator is better than the unemployment rate, which is measured very inconsistently across countries.

3. Income inequality is measured by the GINI index.

4. Public social spending on education, health and social protection reflects the importance of social policies and networks in a given country.

5. Political stability and absence of violence captures the prevalence of political instability or politically motivated violence.

6. Government effectiveness measures the perceived quality of public services, policy implementation and the credibility of government commitments.

7. Corruption perception reflects the perceived extent of corruption in the public sector and the degree to which public power is used for private gain.

8. Trust in government indicates the share of people that trust their national government.

9. Vulnerable employment is made up of own-account workers and contributing family workers who are less likely to have social security coverage and to benefit from other forms of social protection.

10.Imports of food and fuels as % of GDP reflects a country's exposure to external price shocks in essential goods.

11. Currency depreciation captures exchange rate pressures that can amplify imported inflation, particularly for food and energy.

12. Fiscal revenue as % of GDP captures a government's capability to respond with fiscal stimulus to crises.

To make the data comparable across indicators, each of them was rescaled from 0 to 100, with 0 denoting the lowest resilience/higher risk and 100 the highest resilience/lower risk. Then the SRI was calculated as the average of the sub-indicators, thus also ranging between 0 and 100.

Note that in 2023, we renamed the indicator Social Resilience Index (from Social Risk Index) to reflect the scoring system more appropriately, but the methodology remained unchanged.

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